A new caching bug in the djbdns implementation of the DNS protocol was recently announced by Kevin Day, who is a researcher according to The Register. The full details of the bugs and proof-of-concept code can be found in this 10-page PDF. What Day claims is that djbdns is more vulnerable (that is, requiring less effort on the part of an attacker) to poison its cache. than expected. Day states that cache poisoning may lead to session hijacking, unauthorized information leakage, or other circumstances resulting from users or systems being redirected to systems under the attacker's control.
The weakness is that under normal operation simultaneous queries to the djbdns cache for the same domain can be held open, increasing the likelihood of a response collision. See my post On The DNS Birthday Probability for an overview of this type of attack. Certain configurations of djbdns dramatically decrease the number of requests for the birthday attack to succeed, in fact down from around 2 billion to 16 million. The table below, taken from Day's paper, shows that depending on the configuration of the number of UDP connections accepted, the new attack requires between 18 minutes and 70 seconds for a successful poisoning. The popular BIND DNS server can resist the attack for over a day and a half.
Daniel J. Bernstein, a well-known cryptographer and author of the djbdns package, has a standing offer to pay a $1,000 reward to anyone who can find a publicly report a verifiable security hole in his implementation. He may have to get his cheque book out after all.